

THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
WASHINGTON

SECRET

NOV 25 1960

Dear Allen:

The Department of State is currently undertaking a review of U. S. policies in the arms control field. I believe that its efforts would be greatly assisted by the preparation of two National Intelligence Estimates dealing with particular aspects of the disarmament problem.

The first of these Estimates would examine the attitudes and policies on disarmament of three key countries: the USSR, Communist China, and France. I believe it would be more convenient to study the disarmament position of these countries in one paper, rather than in separate Estimates. Suggested terms of reference for this Estimate will be found in Enclosure 1.

The second Estimate would examine the Soviet attitude regarding a cut-off of fissionable materials production for weapon purposes. Suggested terms of reference for this Estimate will be found in Enclosure 2.

I hope that these projects can be undertaken soon.

Sincerely,

Hugh S. Cumming, Jr.
The Director of Intelligence and Research

Enclosures:

As stated.

The Honorable
Allen W. Dulles,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Washington.

State Department review completed

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Enclosure 1.

THE ATTITUDES OF FRANCE, THE USSR, AND COMMUNIST CHINA ON DISARMAMENT

A. The Attitudes and Policies of France on Disarmament

This section of the Estimate should briefly review the major factors determining French views on disarmament, such as: French aspirations to the status of an independent nuclear power; France's views on its role in NATO and on NATO's future military posture; France's general strategic views (on deterrence, etc.); French concerns regarding Germany and the evolution of the Franco-German entente; French views of the Sino-Soviet Bloc; the requirements of the war in Algeria; French concerns regarding African and Middle Eastern developments; French views of the UN; French economic problems.

The main purpose of this Section would be to examine how these and other possible factors influence French views on:

- 1 - adherence to an agreement banning nuclear tests;
- 2 - a nuclear material production cut-off and reductions in stockpiles;
- 3 - limitations on delivery systems;
- 4 - regional measures in Europe, Africa, and the Mediterranean area;
- 5 - conventional arms and troop reductions;
- 6 - measures against surprise attack and accidental war;
- 7 - limitations on the use of outer space for military purposes.

In particular, regarding (1) and (2) above, what conditions would the French insist on as a prerequisite to accepting a curtailment or termination of their nuclear weapons program through international agreement? How firm would this insistence be? What would be the status of the French nuclear weapons stockpile if France ceased testing, say by 1 July, 1961, and ended further fissionable material production for weapons purposes by 1 July, 1961 or 1 July, 1962? Would the French have a capacity for clandestine production? Would they engage in such production?

Also of value would be any judgments on French negotiating tactics and on the French public posture in the disarmament field, including an evaluation of sometime French interest in stressing the use of economic savings from disarmament for assistance to underdeveloped countries.

The Estimate should cover a period of from three to five years.

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B. The Attitudes and Policies of Communist China on Disarmament

This section of the Estimate should examine the factors shaping Chinese Communist views on disarmament and estimate whether Peiping would agree to arms limitations of any kind. If so, what are the specific areas of interest, and why?

Among the factors influencing Peiping's position, the following could be assessed:

- 1 - the Chinese Communist view of military power and war;
- 2 - Chinese Communist views of the probable development of the international situation as they bear on Peiping's attitude respecting disarmament;
- 3 - the influence of ultimate Chinese Communist national ambitions on Peiping's attitude toward disarmament;
- 4 - relations with the USSR as they bear on Chinese attitudes respecting arms control;
- 5 - possible influence of the existence of the GRC on Peiping's disarmament attitude;
- 6 - internal security, economic, and other factors;
- 7 - the possible influence of US military dispositions and alliance systems in Asia on Chinese Communist disarmament attitudes.

Among the specific questions which should be discussed are the following:

1. On what terms would the Chinese Communists agree to participate in negotiations on disarmament with the West?
2. What would be the Chinese Communist conditions (vis-a-vis both the USSR and the West) for adherence: (a) to an agreement barring nuclear tests; (b) to any arrangement precluding independent Chinese development of modern weapons systems; (c) to any agreement to reduce conventional forces, and (d) to arrangements decreasing the likelihood of accidental war?
3. What are Peiping's actual views regarding regional arms limitation, denuclearization, and neutralization proposals?
4. What degree of inspection and control would the Chinese agree to? How likely would they be to engage in evasion of agreements? Would they lend their territory to Soviet evasion?

This Estimate should cover a period of some three to five years.

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C. The Attitude and Policies of the USSR on Disarmament

This Estimate would essentially be an updating of SNIE 11-6-58 and an elaboration of the sections on disarmament in NIEs 11-4-59 and 11-4-60.

Particular attention should be given to:

1 - a review of Soviet military thinking (particularly on deterrence, stability, surprise, accidental war, and limited war) as it relates to possible Soviet interest in arms control;

2 - the net effect on the Soviet military posture of the type of measures proposed by the United States on 27 June, 1960;

3 - the impact of the Sino-Soviet relationship on Soviet disarmament policy;

4 - the impact of the domestic Soviet economic and political situation on Soviet disarmament policy;

5 - the inter-relationship, if any, between Soviet policies on Germany and Berlin and on disarmament;

6 - the inter-relationship between Soviet policies toward "underdeveloped" regions and Soviet disarmament policy;

7 - any indications of evolution of Soviet attitudes on inspection and control.

At an appropriate place in the Estimate there should be an assessment of Moscow's objectives in advocating general and complete disarmament and some prognostication of future Soviet tactics regarding disarmament negotiations, including some judgment on the relative weight likely to be given to agitation and propaganda on the one hand and actual negotiations on the other. Also, there should be an estimate of the kind of partial measures in which the USSR might be interested, and on what terms.

The format and general approach used in SNIE 11-6-58 seem adequate for purposes of the present Estimate.

The period covered should be about three to five years.

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Enclosure 2.

THE SOVIET POSITION REGARDING A CUT-OFF OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS
PRODUCTION FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES

What factors have determined the Soviet position to date on proposals for cessation of fissionable materials production and for reductions of nuclear stockpiles? How are these factors likely to operate in the future, and are there any indications of changes in the Soviet position?

Among the factors which should be considered are: the actual size of the Soviet stockpile, the Soviet estimate of the relative nuclear stockpiles of the United States and the USSR at the moment of cut-off, future Soviet requirements for fissionable materials, Soviet views on the Nth country problem, and Soviet attitudes respecting the inspection system involved in a cut-off.

Leaving aside the question of the actual Soviet decision regarding the proposal, what would be the effect on the Soviet stockpile of a cut-off as of 1 July, 1961, or 1 July, 1962? How would this stockpile be adapted to changing weapons requirements in the next five years? What would be the impact of an annual reduction of the stockpile by 30,000 kg of weapons-grade material, beginning 1 July, 1961? Assuming that the USSR would decide to supply Communist China with weapons-grade material under conditions of a cut-off, what quantities might be involved and what impact would such diversion have on the Soviet stockpile? What would the Soviet capacity for clandestine production be? How likely are they to engage in it?

It is assumed that JAEIC would elaborate the technical terms of reference for this Estimate and make a technical contribution. The final Estimate could have a Restricted Data Annex.


The period for the Estimate should be from five to ten years.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dulles:
General Cabell: *OK (2)*

A copy of this letter and the enclosure has
already been sent to Bob Amory for necessary
action.

TO



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[Signature]
AAB
28 Nov. 60
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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